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ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

This paper aims to research whether the varieties of capitalism
impact the relationship between social capital and inequality in
developed economies (coordinated and liberal economies) and
Latin America (hierarchical economies) in the period from 2000 to
2016. To do that, the study uses a panel analysis of developed
economies and Latin America, that is, a fixed effect panel static
analysis. The model includes one dependent variable (Gini index)
and ten independent variables (generalised trust, informal economy, years of schooling, union density, market capitalization,
annual gross domestic product, gross domestic product per capita, health expenditure, feminine labour force, and gross capital).
The findings show that the relationship between inequality and
social capital is negative and significant and that hierarchical
economies (Latin America) amplified such a relationship.
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1. Introduction
Latin America is the region with the greatest inequality in the world – even higher
than sub-Saharan Africa (The World Bank, 2004). This fact is not new and is
explained by a large number of factors, ranging from socio-cultural to economic.
Piketty (2014) pointed out that the main cause of the increase in inequality, in the
medium and long run, is an interest rate that is higher than economic growth, which
applies to Latin America, as the increase in inequality in the last four decades coincides with low economic growth in the region. Other explanations include the role of
inclusive institutions in reducing inequality (Hartmann et al., 2017). Putnam (2000)
analysed the impact of social capital on income inequality, while several studies found
that an increase in generalised trust negatively affects inequality (Delhey & Newton,
2005; Kawachi et al., 1997; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).
The analysis of the relationship between inequality and social capital is important
because it links aspects that occur in the labour market with the trust of individuals
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to the rest of society. In this way, if workers, through the labour unions, intervene,
directly or indirectly, in the setting of salaries, the wage gap will tend to be smaller.
The latter has two effects – on the one hand, a reduction in inequality, and on the
other hand, an increase in the workers’ trust because they feel that they are part of
the firm decision-making. Overall, the relationship between social capital and inequality shows the institutional choices that society makes in relation to the varieties
of capitalism.
In the literature on varieties of capitalism, Hall and Soskice (2001) concluded that
institutional competitive advantages are a consequence of institutional complementarities. These authors consider that there are two ways in which companies solve their
coordination problems. One is through formal institutions, that is, written laws, contracts, etc. Another is through informal institutions. The first case of such varieties of
capitalism involves the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), with institutional competitive advantages in services. In this case, the model country is the United States. The
second case is the Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), with institutional competitive advantages in advanced manufactures. In this case, the model country would
be Germany. In the first case, there are radical innovations and workers do not intervene in the firm decision-making. Meanwhile, in the second case, there are incremental innovations with workers in the firm decision-making. With regard to Latin
America, Schneider (2009) pointed out that the model of Hall and Soskice (2001)
cannot be applied in developing countries because organisations assume the role of
institutions. Schneider (2013) pointed out that Latin America has Hierarchical Market
Economies (HMEs), with the following organisations: ‘diversified business groups,
multinationals, low-skilled labour and atomistic labour relations’ (p. 553).
Previous studies have not considered the impact of the varieties of capitalism on
the relationship between social capital and inequality. This is important because in
these three types of capitalism (LMEs, CMEs, and HMEs), the different institutional
complementarities and institutional comparative advantages mean that the wage gap
and generalised trust vary.
We argued that, to analyse the relationship between inequality and social capital, it
is necessary to consider the varieties of capitalism, that is, whether countries are
CMEs, LMEs, or HMEs. Thus, in the case of Latin America, the relationship between
inequality and social capital is different from the relationships in other varieties of
capitalism because the organisations that Schneider pointed out have permeated this
relationship, unlike formal (LMEs) and informal (CMEs) institutions. The paper aims
to show that the relationship between social capital and inequality is affected by the
varieties of capitalism and that, in the Latin America case, its HMEs have a direct
effect on this relationship. To do the above, we analyse LMEs, CMEs, and HMEs
through the fixed effects panel data model, which estimates the effect of generalised
trust, a set varieties of capitalism variables, and the Gini index, to determine whether
the relationship between the previous variables is affected by the varieties
of capitalism.
The findings show that the relationship between generalised trust and the Gini
index is amplified in HMEs. Furthermore, union density, years of schooling, informal
economy, and market capitalization affect inequality.
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2. Literature review
The study aims to examine the effect of the varieties of capitalism on the relationship
between social capital and income inequalities in Latin America. Most authors have
observed the existence of a negative correlation between income inequalities and
social capital. Other studies argue the null relationship between both variables when
control variables are included. However, such papers do not consider how the institutional configuration (varieties of capitalism) influences this relationship. Those studies
are characterised by differences of sample analysis in countries, econometric techniques, control and instrumental variables, and the selected analysis periods.
Overall, several empirical studies, developed in recent years, are presented (see
Table 1). Such studies are classified into two groups. The first group shows papers
that confirm the effect of social capital, ethnic diversity, and race on income inequalities. The second group shows results that confirm the null relationship between
both variables.
The first group describes the results in the relationship between social capital and
income inequalities. Within this group are papers at the regional level. For example,
Putnam (2000) pointed out that aspects such as suburbanisation, the pressures of
time and money, incorporating females into the labour market, generational change,
and technology negatively impact social capital, concluding that states with high
social capital generate income equality that diminishes economic disparities.
Narayan and Pritchett (1999) considered that societies have exogenous factors –
such as social capital, education, assets, and the gender of the head of the family –
that have a positive effect on household income. When the members of communities
have associative and communal relations, they provide access to different services and
economic improvement.
Subsequent studies confirmed that an increase in social capital increases average
earnings (Robison et al., 2011). According to Ram (2013), when such a relationship is
analysed in a labour context, generalised trust creates a sense of honesty and respect
by the receipt of compensation that helps mitigate wage inequalities. Similar results
occur with the inclusion of explanatory variables such as polarisation and race and
ethnic diversity (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Costa & Kahn, 2003; Ivarsflaten &
Strømsnes, 2013; Paarlberg et al., 2018; Wright, 2015).
Other studies conducted analyses at the transnational level. For instance, Kawachi
et al. (1997) showed that the wage gap between rich and poor generates disinvestment
in generalised trust and in community participation, causing an increase in mortality
among the countries. Meanwhile, homogenous ethnicities and high educational levels
develop strong trust and dense civic norms.
Delhey and Newton (2005) determined that there is no causal relationship between
generalised trust and wage inequalities. However, they argue that economies with
high interpersonal trust have ethnic homogeneity, government effectiveness, national
wealth, and income equality. Similarly, Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) studied various
well-being measures in developed countries and concluded that countries with high
income inequality have levels of interpersonal trust of 15%, while countries with low
income inequality have trust of around 60–65%.

Compilation of Bjornskov
American Community Survey (ACS)
American Factfinder
TNS Gallup

50 U.S. states

United States

Robison
et al. (2011)
Ram (2013)

Ivarsflaten and
99 communities
Strømsnes (2013)
in Norway
Olivera (2015)

Not specified

25 countries

Wilkinson and
Pickett (2009)

Not specified

76 countries

Bjørnskov (2007)

General Social Survey (GSS)
The Roper Social
Political
Trends Archive
World Values Survey (WVS)

U.S. state level

Rural communities in Social Capital and Poverty Survey
(SCPS)
Tanzania (1,376
households
in 87 groups)
U.S. communities
General
Social Survey (GSS)
The Current Population Survey (CPS)
U.S. communities
American National Election Study
Current Population Survey (CPS)
General Social Survey (GSS)
60 countries
World Values Survey (WVS)

Uslaner and
Brown (2005)

Delhey and
Newton (2005)

Costa and
Kahn (2003)

Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000)

Narayan and
Pritchett (1999)

Knack and
29 market economies World Values Surveys
Keefer (1997)
Kawachi et al. (1997) 39 states
General Social Survey (GSS)

Societies with greater social capital have lower
income inequality.
Countries with fair incomes have greater trust and
dense civic norms.
There is an inverse effect of inequalities of income to
social capital.
High social capital in the communities has a causal
effect on the economic performance of households.

Inverse effect of social capital on income inequalities

Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: Multilevel analysis

Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: OLS
Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: Simple
bivariate correlations
Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: OLS
Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: OLS

Aggregated data
Estimation method: OLS

Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: OLS

Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: Probit analysis

(continued)

Norway shows a high variation in income inequalities
that impact social trust.

Capital changes affecting trade, impacting income
distribution.
In the employment context, social trust mitigates
income inequalities.

Economic inequalities and ethnic diversity
permeate trust.
Economic disparities have a negative effect on
generalised trust.

Countries that are characterised by ethnic homogeneity,
wealth, good governance, religious traditions and
economic equality improve social trust.
Income inequalities have a negative effect on trust and
participation.

Higher income inequalities have a negative effect on
social capital.

Cross-sectional data
Societies with high disparities of income, ethnic
Estimation method: Multivariate analysis
diversity and race show low social participation.

Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: OLS, 2SLS
Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: OLS
Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: OLS

Authors
Sample
Database
Methodology
 First group of papers: Negative correlation of social capital and economic inequalities
Putnam (2000)
U.S. communities
Not specified
Estimation method: OLS

Table 1. Comparative studies: Social capital and economic inequalities.
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Sample

Database

Surveys Monitoring the Future (MtF)

ESS survey Europe
SWIID version 4.0
World Development Indicators

Source: processed and elaborated by authors.

United States

34 European
countries

Methodology
Data panel
Estimation method: Multilevel
and fixed-effects model

Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: Ordered probit
regression and OLS
Gallego (2016)
Netherlands
Longitudinal studies of
Cross-sectional data
Internet for Social Sciences (LISS)
Estimation method: OLS
Barone and
60 countries
World Bank
Data panel
Mocetti (2016)
Global Maximum Income
Estimation method: OLS and 2SLS
Database (Atkinson and Piketty, 2010)
fixed-effects model
World Values Survey
Paarlberg
U.S. counties
Not specified
Cross-sectional data
et al. (2018)
Estimation method: OLS
Authors
Sample
Database
Methodology
 Second group of papers: Null correlation of social capital and economic inequalities
Steijn and
18,119 people
The Survey Program (ISSP)
Cross-sectional data
Lancee (2011)
nested in
Eurostat European Social Survey
Estimation method: Multilevel
20 countries.
logistic and linear models
Fairbrother and
U.S. counties
General social survey
Cross-sectional and longitudinal data
Martin (2013)
Estimation method: Multilevel and
regression logistic models
Ioakimidis and
17 European
Eurostat
Cross-sectional data
Heijke (2016)
countries
European Social Survey (ESS)
Estimation method: OLS and
CIA World
fixed-effects model
Factbook
World Bank
Liu et al. (2017)
United States
Putnam Index
Cross-sectional data
Estimation method: OLS

Wright (2015)

Authors

Table 1. Continued.
Inverse effect of social capital on income inequalities

The disparity of income increases with racial diversity.
Social capital evidences no relationship to economic
inequalities.

Economic inequality has no significant effect on
generalised trust by including the variable of
national wealth.
Studies with cross-sectional data show the association
of income inequalities and trust. The longitudinal
results show no relationship.
There is no correlation between income inequalities and
social capital when including dummy and
control variables.

Greater income inequality and ethnic diversity generate
negative effects on social capital.
Null effect of social capital on income inequalities

Income inequalities affect trust and cooperation of the
lowest-income quintiles.
Developed countries show an inversely proportional
connection between social capital variables and
income inequalities.

The multilevel model shows a negative relationship
between income inequality and social capital;
however, when a fixed-effects model is applied, the
variables have no significance.
Economic inequalities increase the ratio of capital and
the socioeconomic status of the parents.
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Barone and Mocetti (2016) conducted a quantitative econometric study of 60 postindustrial and developing countries, using different variables to quantify income
inequalities, control variables, and instrumental variables. They concluded that there
is a correlation between income inequalities and generalised trust for developed countries but that this effect is not significant for developing regions (Bjørnskov, 2007;
Gallego, 2016; Olivera, 2015).
The second group of studies found no relationship between capital and income
inequalities. Fairbrother and Martin (2013) conducted quantitative research through
cross-sectional and longitudinal data in various counties of the United States. In analysing the cross-sectional data, the study showed the causal effect of income inequality
and social capital, although this was not the case with the longitudinal data.
Similar results occurred in Ioakimidis and Heijke (2016). They argued that sociocultural factors affect the relationship between income inequality and social capital.
In their research, they applied multiple regressions for 17 European countries, using
the type of regime, GDP per capita, education, percentage of urbanisation, and government spending. The results confirmed that income inequalities do not affect generalised trust. The previous variable is related to the democratic regime (Liu et al.,
2017; Steijn & Lancee, 2011).
The previous research examined the correlational and causal relationship of civic
participation, social trust, and economic disparities. However, no research examines
how such an effect varies by including the institutional configuration of capitalism.
We argue that the reduction of social capital (generalised trust) means that various
economic actors do not achieve joint profits, benefiting certain interest groups, such
as managers, owners, and investors (elite groups), and generating an increase in
inequalities of income in HMEs.

3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
To demonstrate whether capitalism varieties negatively affect the relationship between
social capital and income inequalities for HMEs, we examined longitudinal data from
spatial and temporal dimensions. Because dimension had the same number of observations, we used a balanced data panel with effects fixed for 29 countries. This analysis was applied from 2000 to 2016. The sample was divided into three varieties of
capitalism. Thirteen of the countries were classified, according to Schneider and
Karcher (2010), as HMEs. Another 16 economies were divided using Hall and
Soskice’s scheme; six fell into LMEs and 10 fell into CMEs. Table 2 shows these
classifications.
Regarding variables, income inequalities were analysed like dependent variable.
Previous research shows how the decrease in generalised trust and low participation
in networks contributed to greater income inequalities. In terms of the income distribution channel, it was analysed in a manner similar to that of various international
investigations (Berisha & Meszaros, 2018; Mishra, 2018; Mouw, 2003; Pedauga
et al., 2017).

ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA
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Table 2. Countries by type varieties of capitalism.
Varieties of capitalism
Hierarchical Market Economies (HMEs)
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs)
Coordinate Market Economies (CMEs)

Countries
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, and Uruguay.
Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Source: As suggested by Hall and Soskice (2001) and Schneider and Karcher (2010).

We used the data on the standardised global income inequality data (SWIID).
The missing data were estimated using the cross-section multiple imputation
method. We used the Gini index, which represents the distribution of income in
the family market (before taxes and transfers), published in the 2014 version of
the SWIID project (Solt, 2016). The coefficient assumes values from 0 (perfect
equality) to 100 (perfect inequality). As noted by Solt (2016), SWIID maximises
comparability between countries and extended periods of available information on
income inequalities.
Generalised trust was regarded as the independent variable. Several papers measure
social capital from a multidimensional perspective, using variables such as social trust,
participation in networks, and informal social norms (Hawes et al., 2013; Keele,
2005). However, current international research uses generalised trust as a social capital (Barone & Mocetti, 2016; Olivera, 2015). Generalised trust data were obtained
from three databases: Latinobar
ometro (2018), which provided information for the
Latin economies, the World Values Survey (2018), and the European Social Survey
(2018), which includes data for European countries. In the case of missing data, the
cross-section multiple imputation method was implied. The World Values Survey and
the Latinobar
ometro apply the same question: Would you say most people can be
trusted, or should you be very careful when dealing with people? The possible
answers are I) Most people can be trusted, II) I need to be very careful, III) No
answer, and IV) Does not know. The weighting was performed with the percentage
of people who believe they can trust most people, to determine the annual trust
between countries. ESS considers the following question: Would you say that you can
trust most people, or that you cannot be too careful when dealing with people? The
answers range from 0 to 10. A score of 0 implies lower confidence, while 10 implies
greater confidence. We use the sum of the percentage of the scale of the responses
from 6 to 10.
For the case of variables related to varieties of capitalism, we used the country
scheme proposed by Hall and Soskice (2001), Schneider and Karcher (2010) and
Borges et al. (2020). CMEs carry out wage negotiations with the intervention of
employers’ associations and the labour union. Financing is based on their business
networks and banks. Skill development is characterized by the acquisition of specific
skills. The informal economy is low compared to hierarchical economies. LMEs base
the coordination of labour relations on the market; therefore, union participation and
union bargaining are low. Education and vocational training are general; corporate
governance focuses on managers for decision-making. This type of economy has low
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levels in the informal economy. HMEs have a high informal labour market.
Therefore, labour relations have fluid and short-term links between the company and
workers and union participation is low. In addition, workers have limited skills and
there is little development of financial markets.
We examined how institutional indicators condition the effects of social capital
and income inequalities. In particular, we studied how the indicator of labour relations (union density) influences the effect of social capital. Union density measures
the number of workers affiliated with unions, expressed as a percentage of the total
number of workers. Data on union density is drawn from the International Labour
Organization (2018), Visser (2016), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (2018). Missing data were calculated using the cross-sectional multiple imputation method. Another indicator was the informal economy. This variable
means self-employed workers. Informal economy data were obtained from World
Development Indicators (WDI 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018g).
The stock market capitalisation was obtained from WDI (2018a, 2018b, 2018c,
2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018g). Finally, we studied the years of schooling (average); this
variable was obtained from Human Development Reports (2018).
The following control variables were considered: GDP growth per capita (annual
%) and GDP per capita (Ishak, 2008; Royuela et al., 2019; Saucedo Acosta et al.,
2016). GDP per capita means the total gross domestic product in dollar rates using
purchasing power parity, while GDP growth reflects the annual percentage growth
rate of GDP per capita. These data were obtained from WDI (2018a, 2018b, 2018c,
2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018g). Additionally, we used a control variable related to the
concept of social expenditure: health expenditure. Health spending measures the services that are invested in health annually. Health spending data were obtained from
WDI (2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018g). Another control variable was
the feminine labour force. Studies have shown that gender inequalities can increase
wage gaps (Ukhova, 2015). Therefore, the feminine labour force was used as a control
variable. The data were extracted from the WDI (2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e,
2018f, 2018g). Finally, we used gross capital formation as a control variable. This
reflects the investment in fixed assets, such as improvements in land, roads, schools,
and transportation, among others. Data on gross capital formation were drawn from
the WDI (2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018g). Table 3 provides a brief
description of the analysis variables.
Table 4 shows a summary of selected data. The standard deviation indicates
considerable heterogeneity. However, in the context of the analysis of temporal
dimensions, the existence of such a variation is a good prerequisite for econometric analysis, as evaluating the impact of the independent variables (Buterin
et al., 2017).
3.2. Estimation strategy
3.2.1. Correlation analysis
It is important to include the relationship between the dependent variable and the
explanatory and control variables because the correlation analysis shows that the
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Table 3. Variables included in the analysis.
Dependent variable
Variable name
Gini index
Independent variables
Generalised trust

Description
Distribution of income in the
family market.

Data source
Standardised Global Income
Inequality Data (SWIID)

Percentage of trust between people.

Latinobarometro
World Values Survey
European Social Survey
International Labour Organization
the ICTWSS
Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
World Development Indicators
Human Development Reports
World Development Indicators

Labour union

Percentage of workers affiliated to
trade unions.

Informal economy
Years of schooling
Market capitalisation
Control variables
Feminine labour force
GDP growth per
capita (annual%)

Workers who are self-employed
Mean years of schooling
Value of listed shares to GDP

GDP per capita
Gross capital formation

Health expenditure

Labour participation rate, women
Annual percentage growth rate of
GDP per capita in local currency,
at constant prices
Gross domestic product converted
to international dollars using
purchasing power parity rates
Outlays on additions to the fixed
assets of the economy plus net
changes in the level of
inventories.
Current health expenditure
expressed as a percentage
of GDP

World Development Indicators
World Development Indicators
World Development Indicators
World Development Indicators

World Development Indicators

Source: European Social Survey (2018); Human Development Reports (2018); International Labour Organization
(2018); Latinobarometro, (2018); Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018), The ICTWSS
(Visser, 2016), World Development Indicators (2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018g); World Values
Survey (2018), processed and elaborated by authors.

variables are interconnected. However, the coefficient value should never be 1, which
indicates that the variables have the same information.
Table 5 shows the correlation analysis of our study variables. The first segment
refers to the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables. It can
be seen that most of the variables used in the model are correlated with each other
and that their relationship with the dependent variable is negative. This is in line
with what was expected when analysing the set of variables. However, such a negative relationship does not occur with the informal economy variable (E). Studies
consider that developing economies with high levels of poverty and economic
inequalities have higher levels of informal economy (E) (Chen, 2016; Dasgupta &
Lloyd-Jones, 2018). On the order hand, the relationship between generalised trust
(T) and the informal economy (E) is high and negatively correlated. In this sense,
it is reasonable to observe that societies that have high levels of an informal economy (E) are associated with lower levels of social trust. This relationship is possible when societies have power relations and extractive institutions (Coletto
et al., 2018).
The least related variables are union density (W) and market capitalisation (M).
The second segment in Table 5 refers to the control variables. GDP per capita
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Table 4. Summary statistics by varieties of capitalism.
Overall
Gini index
Generalised trust
Informal economy
Years of schooling (average)
Union density
Market capitalisation
Control variables
Feminine labour force
Annual GDP
GDP per capita
Gross capital
Health expenditure
CME
Gini index
Generalised trust
Informal economy
Years of schooling (average)
Union density
Market capitalisation
Control variables
Feminine labour force
Annual GDP
GDP per capita
Gross capital
Health expenditure
LME
Gini index
Generalised trust
Informal economy
Years of schooling (average)
Union density
Market capitalisation
Control variables
Feminine labour force
Annual GDP
GDP per capita
Gross capital
Health expenditure
HME
Gini index
Generalised trust
Informal economy
Years of schooling (average)
Union density
Market capitalisation
Control variables
Feminine labour force
Annual GDP
GDP per capita
Gross capital
Health expenditure

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

493
493
493
493
493
493

39.30
36.96
24.50
10.27
25.62
42.87

10.24
21.54
14.06
2.27
19.56
57.15

21.80
2.40
6.96
5.20
1.10
0.00

61.60
82.80
60.45
14.10
80.11
313.59

493
493
493
493
498

63.64
1.76
29.28
22.01
8.24

9.67
2.87
16.77
4.32
2.25

39.36
11.88
4.40
10.85
3.32

80.33
24.38
65.08
44.31
16.84

170
170
170
170
170
170

29.14
56.20
12.46
11.98
42.65
70.40

3.00
15.83
2.84
1.04
22.41
49.88

21.80
27.70
6.96
9.00
14.53
3.34

41.30
82.80
18.45
14.10
80.11
255.01

170
170
170
170
170

70.76
1.02
44.55
22.76
9.46

6.18
2.10
7.85
2.20
1.15

54.31
8.71
33.87
18.07
6.84

80.33
5.60
65.08
29.32
12.06

102
102
102
102
102
102

33.61
47.08
15.58
12.28
23.44
80.28

2.3
13.33
2.90
0.62
7.35
75.41

29.10
11.20
9.86
10.80
10.30
1.77

38.90
68.20
20.71
13.40
36.37
313.59

102
102
102
102
102

68.55
1.68
41.07
22.38
9.78

4.31
3.05
6.72
3.85
2.76

55.57
5.87
27.62
14.43
5.91

74.98
24.38
63.23
32.68
16.84

221
221
221
221
221
221

49.73
17.48
37.87
8.07
13.53
4.43

4.62
6.99
10.16
1.12
8.44
7.86

39.70
2.40
20.97
5.20
1.10
0.00

61.60
43.60
60.45
10.30
42.00
38.83

221
221
221
221
221

55.91
2.36
12.12
21.39
6.60

7.79
3.16
4.53
5.50
1.35

39.36
11.80
4.40
10.85
3.32

75.03
9.98
22.61
44.31
10.40

Source: processed and elaborated by authors.

(GDPPC) is the highest related variable with the Gini index, and in a related positive
with all the explanatory variables. Annual GDP (AGDP) and gross capital (GC) are
the least correlated with the dependent and explanatory variables.
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Table 5. Correlation matrix.
Explanatory variables
GINI
GINI
T
E
S
W
M
FLF
AGDP
GDPPC
GC
HE

T

E

S

Control variables
W

M

FLF

AGDP

GDPPC

1
0.8417
1
0.8344 0.7328
1
0.8426
0.7381 0.8483
1
0.6672
0.7324 0.6318
0.4754
1
0.4850
0.3846 0.5564
0.6140
0.2359
1
0.6909
0.7388 0.5650
0.7254
0.5076
0.5094
1
0.1776 0.1793
0.1779 0.1561 0.1312 0.1690 0.1295
1
0.8630
0.7906 0.8740
0.9039
0.5526
0.6157
0.7061 0.1608
1
0.1492
0.1207 0.1064
0.2067
0.0184
0.0378
0.0350
0.2334 0.2261
0.5781
0.3927 0.6949
0.6892
0.2325
0.6407
0.4916 0.2250 0.7110
Explanatory variables CME
GINI

T

E

S

GC

1
0.0313

M

FLF

Explanatory variables LME
GINI
T
E
S
W
M
FLF
AGDP
GDPPC
GC
HE

T

E

1
0.6924
0.7881
0.4353
0.5755
0.6186
0.1567
0.0737
0.3309
0.4119
0.6477

1
0.6963
0.4739
0.5486
0.7790
0.2667
0.0009
0.6166
0.2029
0.7158

S

AGDP

GDPPC

GC

GINI

T

1
0.3966
0.2336
0.3951
0.2016
0.1944
0.0708
0.0395
0.3616
0.0134
0.2196

M

FLF

1
0.1106
0.1179
0.1562
0.3678
0.0028
0.0655
0.0680
0.0908
0.0445

AGDP

GDPPC

GC

1
0.6414
1
0.4261 0.5769
1
0.7670
0.6748 0.6125
1
0.1241
0.3922 0.2581
0.1234
1
0.1241 0.2336
0.0845 0.2066 0.2804
1
0.4547
0.4608 0.2543
0.4675 0.3369
0.2005
1
0.5222 0.2324 0.0334 0.2706 0.0968
0.1413 0.1687
1
0.7145
0.6838 0.6830
0.7450
0.0820 0.2097 0.6302 0.2007
E

S

HE

1

Control variables
W

Explanatory variables HME
GINI
T
E
S
W
M
FLF
AGDP
GDPPC
GC
HE

1

Control variables
W

GINI
1
T
0.3013
1
E
0.3150 0.5300
1
S
0.1310
0.2017 0.3406
1
W
0.6170
0.6470 0.4839 0.1304
1
M
0.2266
0.1673
0.2010
0.1431 0.0653
1
FLF
0.0035
0.7584 0.4889
0.5898
0.2918
0.3349
1
AGDP
0.0429 0.0096 0.0073 0.1329
0.0487
0.0090 0.0422
1
GDPPC
0.2400
0.4594 0.3751
0.4157 0.0308
0.0233
0.5781 0.0531
1
0.0070 0.0470
0.0592 0.2549
0.0430
0.1251 0.0822
0.1337 0.2952
1
GC
HE
0.2063 0.1753
0.0832
0.5250 0.3895 0.1209
0.2037 0.2290 0.1634 0.301
GINI

HE

HE

1

Control variables
W

M

FLF

AGDP

GDPPC

1
0.4112
1
0.6659
0.2998
1
0.2140 0.0504
0.1542
1
0.3271
0.0782
0.0709 0.0563
1
0.0064
0.1590 0.0828 0.0244
0.1211
1
0.6298
0.6677
0.4604
0.3451 0.1441
0.0669
1
0.0098
0.4027 0.3181 0.0005 0.1151
0.3480 0.3641
0.5030
0.0491
0.2182
0.2080 0.0602 0.0622 0.3817

GC

1
0.0334

HE

1

Source: processed and elaborated by authors.

3.2.2. Panel data
Panel analysis is a method that takes observations of time on different units, regularly
with a smaller range of time series data, which is suitable for setting up this model.
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The most used methods in these cases (with a small temporal or spatial dimension)
are the methods of fixed and random effects. We used balanced data for 29 countries
over 17 years. The missing data were estimated using a multiple imputation model
proposed for time-series cross-section data by Honaker and King (2010). Overall, the
decision was made to compare three different models.
The shape of the models used here is as follows:
3
Tit
6 Eit 7
7
6
7
yit ¼ ai þ W6
6 Sit 7 þ eit
4 Wit 5
Mit
2

(1)

2

3
Tit
6 Eit 7


6
7
HME
7
þ
G
þ eit ð2Þ
yit ¼ ai þ W6
6 Sit 7
LME
4 Wit 5
Mit
2

3
2
FLF it
Tit
6 Eit 7
6 APIBit
6
7
6
7
6
yit ¼ ai þ W6
6 Sit 7 þ P6 PIBPCit
4 Wit 5
4 GCit
Mit
HEit

3
7
7
7 þ eit
7
5

(3)

where W, P, and G are the vectors of regression coefficients measuring the association of the dependent variable Gini index (yit Þ with the explanatory variables, Tit is
the generalised trust, Eit is the informal economy, Sit is the years of schooling, Wit is
the union density, and Mit is the market capitalisation. In the second model, HME
and LME are the estimation of the slope differences with regard to CME. The third
model included the following control variables: feminine labour forceðFLF it Þ, annual
GDPðAGDPit Þ, GDP per capita (GDPPCit Þ, gross capital (GCit ), and Health expenditure (HEit ).
When ai is correlated with regressors, a model of fixed effects (FEM) is more
appropriate. On the other hand, when the distribution of ai is normal, the method of
random effects (REM) is better.
The estimation of the models was made using a fixed effect transformation, also
called within transformation. This estimation method ‘uses the time-demeaning on each
explanatory variable including things like time-period dummies – and then do a pooled
OLS regression using all time-demeaned variables’ (Wooldridge, 2013, p.485). The fixed
effects model (a.k.a. within or least squares dummy variables), usually estimated by OLS
on transformed data, and gives consistent estimates for b. The package PLM of R, ver0
sion 3.6.2, make a transformation of the data: P ¼ T1 In  jj , Q ¼ InT  P, where T is
the time periods, n is the number of individuals, j a vector of one length T and In the
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identity matrix. It returns a vector containing the values in deviation from the individual
means (Croissant & Millo, 2008).
The fixed effect transformation is unbiased, under an exogeneity assumption on
the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2013). It was used the Hausman test or
Durbin Wu Hausman test, to test the exogeneity assumption, and the model fixed
effect was chosen over the random effect.
In the model 2, variables of varieties of capitalism were added, which show the
interaction with the generalized trust. The model 3 includes control variables, in
order to corroborate the consistency of the model, given the limitation that the
Hausman test (Vinod, 2019).

4. Results
Figure 1 shows some relationships between the Gini index and a set of independent
variables. The first graph (upper left hand) of Figure 1 shows the relationship
between inequality and generalised trust (2000–2016) for 29 countries. Overall, this
graph indicates a negative relationship between the previous variables. However, the
relationship is clearer among HMEs than it is among CMEs and LMEs. The second
graph (upper right hand) shows that the relationship between the Gini index and the
informal economy appears to be positive for the whole sample, but negative for
LMEs. The third graph (middle, left hand) indicates that there is a negative relationship between inequality and years of schooling for the whole sample. However, this
relationship is stronger for HMEs and appears to be negative for LMEs; for CMEs,
there is no clear relationship. The fourth graph (middle, right hand) illustrates the
negative relationship between the Gini index and union density for the whole sample
and applied for the three groups of countries. Finally, the fifth graph (bottom, left
hand) shows that there is no clear relationship between inequality and market capitalization for the whole sample or for HMEs. Nevertheless, for LMEs and CMEs, the
previous relationship appears to be positive.
Table 6 shows the relationship between inequality and a group of independent variables, using a fixed-effects regression model. Model 1 shows the relationship among
the inequality (Gini index) and a set of explanatory variables (generalised trust, informal economy, mean years of schooling, union density and market capitalisation). The
results show a significant and negative relationship between the Gini index and generalized trust, which supports our argument. The coefficients of the varieties of capitalism variables have the expected signs: The informal economy variable is significant
and positively affects inequality, while years of schooling and union density are significant and negatively affect inequality. The effect of years of schooling is higher
than generalised trust and union density in reducing inequality.
In model 2, the Gini index was regressed with the same variables as in model 1,
and a factor variable was introduced that estimates the effect of the generalized trust
by varieties of capitalism on the relationship with inequality.
The CME was considered as a base (i.e. null correlation), HME generalized trust
has a stronger negative and significant correlation with the Gini index (0.272),
while LME generalised trust is negative and significant (0.089), but smaller than
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Figure 1. Plots of Gini index and independent variables, by variety of capitalism, 2000-2016.
Source: Authors’ calculation

HME (Figure 1), which is in line with our argument. The union density coefficient is
significant and negative (0.103) and the market capitalisation coefficient is significant and positive, which is in line with the varieties of capitalism theory. The
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Table 6. Fixed effects model (FEM). Dependent variable: Gini index.
Variable
Model 1
Generalized trust
Informal economy
Years of schooling
Union density
Market capitalisation
Hausman test
R-sq (within)
R-sq (between)
R-sq (overall)
F (model)
Observations
Model 2
Generalized trust
Generalized trustHME
Generalized trustLME
Informal economy
Years of schooling
Union density
Market capitalisation
Hausman test
R-sq (within)
R-sq (between)
R-sq (overall)
F (model)
Observations
Model 3
Generalized trust
Informal economy
Years of schooling
Union density
Market capitalisation
Control variables
Feminine labour force
Annual GDP
GDP per capita
Gross capital
Health expenditure
Hausman test
R-sq (within)
R-sq (between)
R-sq (overall)
F (model)
Observations

Coef.

p

s.e.

0.1628
0.1610
1.5382
0.0622
0.0012
12.35
0.8316
0.8641
0.8381
490.08
493

0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0008
0.7896
0.0302

0.0171
0.0297
0.2028
0.0156
0.0044

0.042
0.272
0.089
0.003
0.021
0.103
0.008
1162
0.9186
0.8578
0.9067
619.35
493

0.0210
0.0001
0.0008
0.9051
0.8975
0.0001
0.0355
0.0001

0.141
0.096
1.188
0.072
0.007

0.0001
0.0101
0.0001
0.0001
0.1831

0.021
0.037
0.236
0.016
0.005

0.013
0.059
0.125
0.124
0.124
19.14
0.8447
0.8727
0.8364
282.34
493

0.7171
0.4589
0.0002
0.4456
0.4429
0.0239

0.035
0.079
0.034
0.161
0.162

0.0001
0.018
0.034
0.034
0.022
0.166
0.012
0.004

0.0001

0.0001

Source: author calculation with plm package in R, version 3.6.2.

marginal effect of generalised trust (model 2) is higher in HMEs than in CMEs and
LMEs, which means that small increases in Latin American countries’ generalised
trust lead to high reductions in the inequality of this region.
In model 3, the Gini index was regressed with the same variables as model 1 and
five control variables. The results show that the coefficient of generalised trust
remains negative and significant (0.141), which also supports our argument. The
variables of years of schooling and union density have a negative and significant relationship with inequality (as in model 1), while the informal economy variable has a
positive relationship with the Gini index. The GDP per capita variable has a negative
relationship with inequality, which means that increases in GDP per capita tend to
reduce inequality.
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Overall, the three models of Table 6 show the negative effect of union density on
inequality levels, while two models present the high effect of education on the reduction of inequality. The variables of varieties of capitalism indicate that the effect of
generalised trust varies across the type of capitalism, and HMEs have a higher marginal effect (of generalised trust) on inequality.

5. Discussions and conclusions
The paper aimed to show how the varieties of capitalism – which for this study were
HMEs, LMEs, and CMEs – affect the relationship between inequality and generalised
trust. The results showed evidence that the relationship between inequality and social
capital is stronger in HMEs than in LMEs/CMEs – that is, in economies with low levels of inequality, changes in generalised trust do not affect the Gini index.
The obtained results support our argument because they showed that in the cluster
formed by HMEs, the relationship between inequality and social capital (generalised
trust) is stronger. Latin American countries show levels of inequality ranging from a
Gini index of 35 to 50, while generalised trust ranges from almost 10 to 25. The relationship is negative and stronger than CME and LME. In this sense, when a country
is an HME, it tends to show a negative relationship between inequality and generalised trust.
Our results coincide with those of Putnam (2000) and Narayan and Pritchett
(1999) because high levels of social capital imply low inequality, which would be the
case with CMEs. These authors analysed communities and sub-national entities,
while, in our case, we used countries. However, the results are the same because
countries, states, and communities with high levels of social capital tend to have low
levels of inequality. Ram (2013) focused on the labour context but the results are
similar to those we found: High levels of generalised trust tend to decrease
wage inequality.
Kawachi et al. (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Delhey and Newton (2005)
obtained results similar to those presented. They indirectly showed the existence of a
negative relationship between inequality and social capital in an international context.
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) found quantitative results that support the idea that
CMEs have high levels of social capital associated with low inequality, while HMEs
are characterized by low levels of social capital and high levels of inequality. On the
other hand, our results do not coincide with those of Fairbrother and Martin (2013)
because, in our study, the link between inequality and generalised trust in developing
countries (HMEs) is stronger than it is in developed countries (CMEs). The results
obtained do not coincide with those of a group of scholars who believe that income
inequalities do not affect social capital (Ioakimidis & Heijke, 2016; Liu et al., 2017;
Steijn & Lancee, 2011).
The main weakness of the paper is that we used only the Gini index as a dependent variable. We could improve the econometric analysis if we include the Palma
ratio and the 1% income concentration as dependent variables.
Additionally, from the results, we can consider that hierarchical capitalism generates conditions for workers to receive low salaries because the competitive advantages
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are commodities and simple manufactures. This fact, on the one hand, increases
income inequality between low-skilled workers and the managers and owners of companies with high profit rates. On the other hand, it reduces generalised trust because
workers do not see hierarchical capitalism as fair.
The results showed that the varieties of capitalism framework affects the relationship between social capital and inequality. From the above, the following questions
could arise What organisations, in the sense of Schneider (2013), most affect inequality and social capital in Latin America? Did the reconfiguration of these organisations
have some effects on the fall of inequality and the increase in social capital in the
2000s in Latin America? Future research should focus on how the organisations that
Schneider proposed have affected inequality and social capital in Latin America.
This paper presents new evidence to explain the relationship between inequality
and social capital through the use of varieties of capitalism. The original contribution
shows that in Latin America, there is hierarchical capitalism that strengthens the
negative relationship between inequality and generalised trust. In the 2000s, there was
a fall in inequality in most Latin American countries, which this study explains by
the strong link between this variable and social capital. The original contribution of
this paper can be generalised not only for Latin America but also for HMEs around
the world.
Our conclusions show that the relationship between inequality and social capital is
stronger in HMEs, which can be regarded as an advance in the current state of
research on the determinants of inequality in Latin America.
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